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MCDONALD V. CHICAGO: WHICH STANDARD OF 
SCRUTINY SHOULD APPLY TO GUN-CONTROL 
LAWS? 
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm** 
Introduction 
In this debate, Professors Rosenthal and Malcolm debate the standard 
of scrutiny that the Supreme Court should apply to restrictions on the 
Second Amendment in the wake of its recent decision, McDonald v. City of 
Chicago.  Professor Rosenthal begins Part I by noting the importance of 
gun-control laws to police; he considers a lower standard of scrutiny neces-
sary to allow law enforcement officials to protect the community.  Turning 
to the practical consequences of Chicago and Washington, D.C.'s recent 
gun-control laws, which make owning a gun nearly impossible in those ci-
ties, Professor Malcolm argues for a standard of strict scrutiny for all gun-
control laws in Part II.  Finally, in Part III, Professor Rosenthal replies. 
I. Second Amendment Plumbing After McDonald: Exploring the 
Contradiction in the Second Amendment 
Lawrence Rosenthal 
It took two landmark decisions to reach the end of the beginning.  In 
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court, adopting what it charac-
terized as ―the original understanding of the Second Amendment,‖2 held 
that the Second Amendment secures an individual‘s right to keep and bear 
arms against the federal government.  On that basis, the Court invalidated 
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1
  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (link). 
2
  Id. at 2816. 
3
  Id. at 2817–22. 
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McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 the Court concluded that by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms is enforceable against state and local governments.5  Now, the more 
prosaic but perhaps more important work begins.  It is time to start putting 
the doctrinal ―plumbing‖ in place.6 
A.  
Likely the most important piece of plumbing that will need to be in-
stalled is the standard of scrutiny to be applied to gun-control laws chal-
lenged under the Second Amendment.  This is no small matter.  As Eugene 
Volokh has observed, given the many difficulties in assessing the efficacy 
of gun-control laws, it is enormously difficult to produce empirical support 
for gun-control regulations, and therefore a rigorous form of strict scrutiny, 
requiring the government to demonstrate that a challenged regulation is the 
essential means for achieving a compelling governmental interest, would 
likely be the death knell for most gun-control laws.7 
The Supreme Court has not yet offered much guidance on the Second 
Amendment standard of scrutiny.  In Heller, the Court invalidated the Dis-
trict‘s ban on handguns and its requirement that all firearms in a home re-
main unloaded and inoperable,8 but refused to decide what type of 
justification is required for firearms regulation, although it did reject a test 
limited to ascertaining whether a challenged regulation lacks a rational ba-
sis, as well as Justice Breyer‘s proposed interest-balancing test.9  In McDo-
nald, the Court was silent on the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny, 
with a four-justice plurality adding only that Fourteenth Amendment stan-
dards for state and local gun-control laws are no different than those applied 





  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
5
  Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (relying on the Due Process Clause); id. at 3077–88 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
6
  For the source of the metaphor, see Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 898, 90708 (2004) (reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)). 
7
  See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analyti-
cal Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 146568 (2009).  For a helpful discus-
sion of the difficulties in assembling empirical evidence of the efficacy of gun-control laws, see MARK 
V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN‘T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 77–85 
(2007). 
8
  128 S. Ct. at 2817–19 (link). 
9
  Id. at 2817 n.27, 2821. 
10
  130 S. Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion).  Justice Thomas‘s separate opinion suggests this symmetry 
as well, see id. at 3083 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), although he left 
open the question whether noncitizens may assert Second Amendment rights against state and local gov-
ernments.  See id. at 3083 n.19.  To be sure, a majority characterized the right to keep and bear arms as 
―fundamental,‖ see id. at 3041–42, and there is authority suggesting that burdens on rights regarded as 
fundamental should be subject to strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSTY L AW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/ 87 
commentators have sharply divided on the appropriate standard for scrutiny 
under the Second Amendment,11 as have the lower courts.12 
To make matters more concrete, consider the potential Second 
Amendment right to carry firearms in public.  The Second Amendment 
provides: ―A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.‖13  In Heller, the Court cautioned that: 
 
‗[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the vot-
ers; its words and phrases were used in their normal and 
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.‘  Normal 
meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but 
it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not 
                                                                                                                           
(link); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 3031 (1968) (link).  This rule, however, is not invariably ap-
plied.  See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 696700 
(2007).  More important for present purposes, we will see that the Second Amendment contains a textual 
basis for regulatory authority that makes strict scrutiny unwarranted.  See infra Part II. 
11
  See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment RightPost-Heller Standard of 
Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 66–71 (2009) (enhanced rational basis review); Carlton F.W. Larson, 
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379–80 (2009) (something less than strict scrutiny); Calvin Massey, Second 
Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1442–43 (2009) (regulation must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence to advance a compelling governmental interest); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Second Amendment Plumbing after Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Mi-
litias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 79–84 (2009) (undue burden test); Allen Rostron, 
Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control after District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 383, 407–08 (2009) (reasonableness test) ); Mark Tushnet, District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 423–32 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Vo-
lokh, supra note 7, at 1454–61 (regulations imposing a substantial burden on Second Amendment rights 
should be evaluated by assessing the ―magnitude of the burden‖ in light of its justification); Jason T. 
Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 577–87 (2009) (intermediate scrutiny); Ryan L. 
Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Con-
stitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches for Future Judicial 
Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 B.Y.U. J. PUB. INT. L. 259, 286–87 (2009) (same); Lindsay 
Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD. 
L. REV. 889, 904–13 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amend-
ment Framework within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1570–73 (2009) (a ―de-
ferential form of strict scrutiny‖); Sarah Perkins, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second 
Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 107990 (2010) (intermediate scrutiny); Jason Ra-
cine, Note, What the Hell[er]? The Fine Print Standard of Review under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 
605, 617–20 (2009) (undue burden). 
12
  For a recent decision usefully summarizing the disarray in the lower courts, see Heller v. District 
of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184–86 (D.D.C. 2010) (link).  In the most extensive discussion of the 
issue to date at the appellate level, the Seventh Circuit recently held that the Second Amendment re-
quires a form of intermediate scrutiny such that the challenged regulation be substantially related to a an 
important governmental objective.  See United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 2735747, at *3 
(7th Cir. July 13, 2010) (en banc) (link). 
13
  U.S. CONST. amend. II (link). 
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have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding gen-
eration.14 
 
The Court then relied on framing-era sources to define the term ―arms‖ 
as ―weapons . . . ‗in common use at the time‘‖;15 the right to ―keep‖ arms as 
the right to possess them;16 and the right to ―bear‖ arms as the right to ―car-
ry[] for a particular purpose—confrontation.‖17  The Second Amendment 
provides that these rights ―shall not be infringed.‖  According to perhaps the 
leading framing-era dictionary, Noah Webster‘s 1828 American Dictionary 
of the English Language, ―infringed‖ meant ―[b]roken, violated, trans-
gressed,‖18 which seems to support a vigorous conception of an individual 
right to possess and carry firearms.19  Indeed, in Heller, while noting in dic-
ta that ―the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held 
that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the 
Second Amendment or state analogues,‖20 the Court added that antebellum 
nineteenth-century cases had understood the Second Amendment to secure 
a right to carry firearms openly.21  Professor Volokh, even while rejecting 
strict scrutiny of gun-control laws, has opined that Heller likely secures a 
right to carry loaded firearms in public, at least openly.22  He has also ex-
pressed doubt about prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, stating 
that there is not much beyond the Heller dictum and their historical pedi-
gree to support these laws.23  I have also expressed doubts about whether 
these laws can survive Heller.24 
The consequences for urban law enforcement are potentially serious.  
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the unprecedented spike in violent crime 
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s was largely a function of urban fire-
arms-related crime in disadvantaged and unstable inner-city neighborhoods, 
arising from competition in emerging markets for crack cocaine.25  The abil-





  128 S. Ct. at 2788 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) 
(brackets in original)) (link). 
15
  Id. at 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
16
  Id. at 2792. 
17
  Id. at 2793. 
18
  1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 110 (1828). 
19
  See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS‘ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 328–30 (2008); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1359, 1404–09. 
20
  128 S. Ct. at 2816. 
21
  Id. at 2809. 
22
  See Volokh, supra note 7, at 1516–20. 
23
  See id. at 1521–24. 
24
  Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 45–47. 
25
  See id. at 7–15. 
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case of confrontation‖26 was central to this violent competition, since the 
creation and control of territorial drug-distribution monopolies involved the 
ready availability of firearms.27  There is, in turn, substantial evidence that 
the large declines in urban crime that followed the crime spike were attri-
butable to aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, which made it far riskier to car-
ry guns and drugs in public.28  Prohibitions on carrying weapons, in turn, 
played an important role in these police tactics, since they confer upon po-
lice a critical source of stop-and-frisk authority whenever officers reasona-
bly suspect a suspect to be carrying a firearm.29  Recognition of a 
constitutional right to carry firearms, at least openly, would grant drug traf-
fickers and gang members effective immunity from stop-and-frisk tactics, 





  D. C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008). 
27
  See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 15–20. 
28
  See id. at 30–35. 
29
  See id. at 37–44. 
30
  See id. at 45–48.  One article questions this conclusion, speculating that police would respond to a 
constitutional right to carry firearms by utilizing alternate grounds for stop-and-frisk, ―such as suspicion 
of drug crimes or even curfew violations,‖ or relying on an ―officer safety justification.‖  Philip J. Cook, 
Jens Ludwig, & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Wel-
fare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1080 n.214 (2009).  This speculation rests on an assumption 
that there is some sort of equilibrium of reasonable suspicion such that if one basis for suspicion be-
comes unavailable to officers, they can always shift to another.  The authors offer no support for this as-
sumption, however, and there is little basis to suppose that when one justification for stop-and-frisk is 
eliminated, police can always come up with another.  Given that police in departments committed to ag-
gressive stop-and-frisk already have an incentive to maximize stop-and-frisk rates, it is doubtful that a 
reduction in stop-and-frisk authority of one type will be offset by increasing stop-and-frisk authority on 
other grounds.  The available data, moreover, shows that weapons searches are an especially important 
source of stop-and-frisk authority for departments that use stop-and-frisk tactics aggressively.  For ex-
ample, in New York, in an 18-month period studied by the Attorney General during the crime-decline 
period, stop-and-frisks reflected in mandated reports based on suspected weapons offenses made up 
44.6% of all stops, while suspected drug offenses were involved in 8.4% and misdemeanor/quality of 
life offenses were involved in 7.7%.  CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF ATT‘Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF 
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT‘S ―STOP AND FRISK‖ PRACTICES app. tbl. I.A.5 (Dec. 
1, 1999), available at GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com (search ―new york attorney general stop 
and frisk report methodology and appendices‖) (link).  Reports are mandated ―when a suspect is (i) 
‗stopped‘ by the use of force; (ii) frisked (i.e., patdown) and/or ‗searched‘ (i.e., searched inside cloth-
ing); (iii) arrested; or (iv) ‗stopped‘ and the suspect refused to identify him or herself.‖  Id. at 6364 (in-
ternal footnotes and underlining omitted).  For all reports, even if not mandated, 19.2% are based on 
suspicion of violent crime; 34.0% on weapons offenses; 15.8% on property crime; 8.7% on drug of-
fenses; and 10.2% on misdemeanor/quality of life offenses.  Id. at 10910 & tbl. I.A.5.  Moreover, there 
is no free-floating authority consistent with the Fourth Amendment to stop and frisk an individual based 
on ―officer safety‖ absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in unlawful activity.  The rule 
permitting a stop-and-frisk based on reasonable suspicion permits an officer to approach a suspect ―for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior . . . .‖  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (link).  
This requirement is fully applicable to stop-and-frisk involving suspected firearms.  See, e.g., Florida v. 
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (―Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to 
public safety; Terry‘s rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion 
rather than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very 
concern.  But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far.‖) 
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Thus, the stakes are high.  A vigorous conception of Second Amend-
ment rights could enable urban street gangs to act as occupying armies.  As 
long as they commit no overt crimes while police officers are present, they 
could use their ability to go about armed to establish criminal mini-states 
based on drug trafficking—much as they did during the crime-spike era.31  
Everything depends on the type of justification that courts will require to 
regulate the possession of guns.32 
B.  
At first blush, Heller seems to clinch the case for a right of gang mem-
bers and drug dealers to carry firearms.  As we have seen, Heller defined 
                                                                                                                           
(citation omitted) (link).  Thus, Terry requires suspicion of illegality; it follows that when applicable law 
does not ban carrying a firearm, the Fourth Amendment does not permit a stop-and-frisk for firearms, 
because there is no reason to believe that the suspect violated any law.  See, e.g., United States v. Bur-
ton, 228 F.3d 524, 528–30 (4th Cir. 2000) (link); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 
2000) (link); Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 890–91 (D.C. 1991) (link); Commonwealth v. Cou-
ture, 552 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1990) (link); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2004).  Heller leaves open the possibility of 
requiring a license to carry firearms, see 128 S. Ct. at 2819, but in the context of vehicles, the Court has 
held that the Fourth Amendment forbids investigative stops to check the license and registration of a ve-
hicle absent some particularized reason to believe that the suspect has violated licensing requirements or 
another law.  See Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 65563 (1979) (link); see also City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4048 (2000) (invalidating roadblocks to check vehicles for guns and drugs in 
high-crime areas) (link). 
31
  See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1114, 4548. 
32
  Some have argued that the Second Amendment right should be limited to possessing and using 
firearms within one‘s home, since privacy interests subside and governmental regulatory interests are 
greater once firearms are taken outside the home.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a 
Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 23133 (2008); Darrell A.H. Mil-
ler, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1297–
1355 (2009).  Whatever the merits of this view in terms of policy, however, it is hard to reconcile with 
Heller‘s textualism.  As we have seen, Heller defined the right to bear arms to include carrying them for 
purposes of confrontation, and it does not seem particularly plausible to understand this analysis of the 
text as recognizing only a right to ―bear‖ arms from the bedroom to the living room.  For additional crit-
ical discussion of this understanding of Second Amendment rights, see Eugene Volokh, The First and 
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009) (link).  Others have argued that Second 
Amendment doctrine should adopt the rule found in First Amendment doctrine that permits reasonable 
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech and apply it to the right to keep and bear arms.  See, 
e.g., Christopher A. Chrisman, Mind the Gap: The Missing Standard of Review under the Second 
Amendment (and Where to Find It), 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 289 (2006); Janice Baker, Comment, The 
Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 57–60 (2002); Gary E. Barnett, Note, The Reasonable Regula-
tion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 607, 621–28 (2008).  Yet, the anal-
ogy between First and Second Amendment rights is a difficult one because ―the right to arms stems from 
concerns about self defense and the defense of public liberty . . . .  [T]he Second Amendment‘s right to 
arms is about capabilities more than expression.‖  Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some 
Notes on Firearms, the Second Amendment, and “Reasonable Regulation”, 75 TENN. L. REV. 137, 147–
48 (2007) (footnote omitted).  Beyond that, First Amendment doctrine treats deferentially laws directed 
not at the content of speech but rather some nonspeech evil, whereas gun-control laws are usually di-
rected at the right to keep and bear arms as defined in Heller.  See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 429–31. 
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the right to ―bear‖ arms as a right to carry firearms for purposes of confron-
tation.  The Court did not define the right in terms limited to those who car-
ry for purposes of legitimate self-defense; indeed, it explained that the term 
includes ―the carrying of the weapon . . . for the purpose of ‗offensive or de-
fensive action,‘‖33 adopting a definition of ―carry‖ originally used in con-
nection with a federal statute that enhances sentences for anyone who 
―during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime  
. . . uses or carries a firearm.‖34  Thus, it seems that even the criminally-
minded have a right to ―bear‖ arms. 
Yet there is more going on in Heller than first meets the eye.  The 
Court was rigorously textualist when defining the right to ―keep and bear 
arms,‖ but when it considered whether the District of Columbia‘s handgun 
ban ran afoul of the Second Amendment, the Court found that textualism 
offered little assistance.  Instead of making an effort to determine whether a 
handgun ban ―infringed‖ the right to keep and bear arms in light of the orig-
inal meaning of that term, the Court approached the question in a more indi-
rect way, perhaps recognizing that the term ―infringed‖ is ambiguous as 
applied to a law that permits the District‘s residents to possess some types 
of ―arms‖ but not others.  The Court wrote that ―[t]he handgun ban amounts 
to a prohibition of an entire class of ‗arms‘ that is overwhelmingly chosen 
by American society for that lawful purpose,‖ and ―extends, moreover, to 
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.‖35  It added that ―[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come 
close to the severe restriction of the District‘s handgun ban.  And some of 
those few have been struck down.‖36  Handguns, the Court wrote, are consi-
dered ―the quintessential self-defense weapon.‖37  The Court also characte-
rized a number of firearms regulations as ―presumptively lawful,‖38 
including ―prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,‖ and ―prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbid-
ding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and gov-
ernment buildings . . . .‖39 
Commentators have suggested that the Court took a categorical ap-
proach in which ―core‖ Second Amendment interests receive something 





  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting)). 
34
  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (link). 
35
  128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
36
  Id. at 2818. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Id. at 2817 n.26. 
39
  Id. at 2816–17. 
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greater regulation.40  Still, it is far from clear how to go about determining 
whether a challenged regulation implicates only penumbral interests.  Fram-
ing-era practice appears to be of little help.  Not only did the Court claim no 
historical support for a core-and-penumbra approach, but it acknowledged 
that there was little framing-era support for firearms regulation aside from 
laws addressing gunpowder storage and the discharge of firearms.41  Never-
theless, the Court treated some regulations that lack support in framing-era 
practice as presumptively lawful.  Prohibitions on carrying concealed wea-
pons, for example, did not emerge until the 1820s and 1830s in response to 
a surge in violent crime in the nation‘s growing cities.42  Prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by convicted felons were uncommon until they 
emerged in the twentieth century in response to a crime wave that followed 
the First World War.43  For this reason, some have denounced the Court‘s 
treatment of these ―presumptively lawful‖ regulations as inconsistent with 
the Court‘s originalist analysis.44 
Perhaps Heller’s dicta regarding presumptively lawful firearms regula-
tion will one day be discarded as inconsistent with the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment.  After all, in the operative clause, the only term 
that could be thought to support a regulation of the right to ―carry‖ ―in case 
of confrontation‖ is the term ―infringed,‖ and, as we have seen, that term, at 
least as a matter of its common framing-era usage, does not appear to allow 
regulatory power over the right to bear arms.  There is, however, a textual 
basis for regulatory authority—the Second Amendment‘s preamble; in par-
ticular, its reference to ―[a] well regulated militia.‖ 
In Heller, the Court explained that the original meaning of the term 
―militia‖ was not the members of a formal military organization, but rather 
―the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the 
sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.‖45  The 





  See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analy-
sis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–11 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 976–77 (2009) (link). 
41
  128 S. Ct. at 2819–21. 
42
  See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 138–44 (2006); Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of 
the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of His-
tory, 17 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 571, 582–85 (2006). 
43
  See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 
695, 698–728 (2009). 
44
  See, e.g., Larson, supra note 11, at 1372–79; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and 
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356–62 (2009). 
45
  128 S. Ct. at 2817.  The dissenters added that the first militia act, enacted the same year the 
Second Amendment was ratified, defined the militia as ―every able-bodied white male citizen between 
the ages of 18 and 45‖ and required each ―to ‗provide himself with a good musket or firelock‘ and other 
specified weaponry.‖  Id. at 2842 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Act of May 8, 
1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271). 
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those ―physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense,‖46 
rather than being limited to ―the organized militia.‖47 The Court breezed 
past the adjective ―well-regulated,‖ writing that it ―implies nothing more 
than the imposition of proper discipline and training.‖48  But, we should 
pause to consider the interaction between noun ―militia‖ and its adjective, 
―well-regulated.‖  If the militia includes everyone capable of bearing arms, 
even if not part of an organized militia, and the government may subject 
this unorganized ―militia‖ to ―proper training and discipline,‖ then the 
preamble envisions comprehensive regulation of all who possess and carry 
firearms, not merely those in formal military or paramilitary organizations.  
After all, the word ―militia‖ appears only once in the Second Amendment, 
and if it includes all who are capable of bearing arms even if not part of an 
organized military organization, then this same group is subject to regulato-
ry authority.  Accordingly, the regulatory power envisioned in the preamble 
extends to the whole of the populace capable of exercising Second 
Amendment rights.  Moreover, Heller adds that the preamble is properly 
consulted to clarify the meaning of the Second Amendment‘s operative 
clause.49 
Accordingly, the Second Amendment, construed in light of the pream-
ble, recognizes a general regulatory power over the possession and carrying 
of firearms (although presumably the source of regulatory authority would 
be found outside of the preamble, such as state and local police powers or 
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce).  For this reason, it is ap-
propriate to construe the term ―infringed‖ in the Second Amendment‘s 
operative clause in a manner that preserves the regulatory power acknowl-
edged in the preamble.  This approach, in turn, does a great deal to explain 
the basis for the Court characterizing as ―presumptively lawful,‖ regulations 
that would otherwise seem to ―infringe‖ the right to ―possess‖ firearms or 
―carry in case of confrontation,‖ such as laws forbidding concealed carry. 
To be sure, one could argue that regulatory power under the Second 
Amendment is limited to the eighteenth-century regulations extant at the 
time of the Second Amendment‘s ratification, but that rationale is not only 
inconsistent with Heller‘s dicta, but also fails to take adequate account of 
McDonald.  In McDonald, a majority of the Court concluded that the 
Second Amendment must be understood as it had come to be regarded at 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ratification.50  By then, of course, 





  Id. at 2799. 
47
  Id. at 2800. 
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. at 2789–90. 
50
  See 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–42 (2010).  For elaboration on the argument that the Second Amend-
ment‘s incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the Second Amendment be inter-
preted as it was understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s adoption, see AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258–66 (1998). 
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of firearms,51 as Heller acknowledged.52  It follows that by the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was understood that under the Second 
Amendment, regulatory powers were not static, and could expand in re-
sponse to felt exigencies such as the wave of urban crime in the 1820s and 
1830s that produced the first concealed carry prohibitions in America.53 
Thus, even though the Court rejected an interest-balancing test in Hel-
ler,54 a point reiterated in the four-justice plurality opinion in McDonald,55 
the historical acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions cannot be ex-
plained by anything other than this very type of interest-balancing—an ap-
proach that does not require the kind of compelling empirical evidence of 
necessity that the strict scrutiny test demands.  Despite Heller, interest-
balancing may be inescapable in Second Amendment jurisprudence.56  To 
avoid the need to repudiate what seems like a clear statement to the contrary 
in Heller, the Court may utilize a different form of words, such as an undue 
burden test, but in the practical operation, its approach is likely to be little 
different.57  No other provision of the Bill of Rights contains the type of tex-
tual acknowledgement of governmental regulatory power found in the 
Second Amendment.  It would be anomalous, to say the least, for the Court 
to recognize less regulatory power with respect to Second Amendment 
rights than is generally acknowledged with respect to the rest of the Bill of 
Rights.58 
C.  
Even granting that prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms are 
likely to survive under some version of an undue burden or interest-
balancing test, the question remains whether the Second Amendment grants 





  See, e.g., ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 7174 (2001); HALBROOK, supra 
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  See 128 S. Ct. at 2816. 
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  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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  128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
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  130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
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  See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1569–73 (2009). 
57
  One student commentator discounted the possibility that the Court will adopt an undue burden 
test on the ground that this test has been repudiated by Justices Scalia and Thomas as a matter of due 
process jurisprudence.  See Gould, supra note 11, at 1573–75.  Nevertheless, a majority of the remaining 
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to subscribe to this test when it was necessary to assemble a majority behind a result which they other-
wise approved.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 162627, 162839 (2007) (link). 
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  For a discussion that considers the appropriate standard of scrutiny for the Second Amendment in 
light of those employed for other provisions in the Bill of Rights, see Winkler, supra note 10, at 693–96. 
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urban gangs from stop-and-frisk tactics, at least for gang members who are 
not convicted felons or not otherwise subject to the regulatory powers ac-
knowledged as legitimate in Heller.  After all, an undue burden test cannot 
render a right nugatory, and as Heller defined the right to bear arms, it 
seems inescapable that some sort of right to carry firearms—at least in non-
sensitive public places—must be recognized if the right to ―bear‖ arms is to 
avoid becoming superfluous in light of the right to ―keep‖ them.  Now, we 
have finally reached the essential contradiction in the Second Amendment 
as applied to contemporary urban America. 
While Heller characterized the right to keep and bear arms as an aspect 
of what was regarded in the framing era as a natural right of self-defense,59 
in contemporary America, a right to keep and bear arms does not necessari-
ly enhance security.  Research discloses, for example, that gang members 
carry firearms at significantly elevated rates.60  Yet their ability to defend 
themselves does not make gang members safer; instead, they face an 
enormous risk of violent victimization.  For example, a study of Los An-
geles County gang members during the crime-rise period estimated that 
they were sixty times more likely to be homicide victims than were mem-
bers of the general population.61  A study of gang members in St. Louis 
found a homicide rate 1,000 times higher than that of the general popula-
tion.62  A study of a large African-American drug trafficking gang found 
that over a four-year period, gang members had a 25% chance of being 
killed.63 
The prevalence of violence in gang-dominated neighborhoods, moreo-
ver, serves to make firearms more pervasive in those communities, as the 
perception of danger in high-crime neighborhoods becomes a further stimu-
lus to carry a gun as a means of self-protection.64  As Jeffrey Fagan and 
Deanna Wilkinson‘s study of at-risk youth in New York explains, when in-
ner-city youth live under the threat of violence in an environment in which 
firearms are prevalent, not only are they more likely to arm themselves, but 
they become increasingly likely to respond to real or perceived threats and 
provocations with lethal violence, creating what the authors characterize as 
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VIOLENCE 173 (1996). 
63
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A number of studies found that gang-related homicides have an indepen-
dent and positive effect on the homicide rate.66  One study of homicide in 
New York, for example, found evidence of a contagion effect of firearms-
related violence, which stimulated additional firearms violence in nearby 
areas.67  In such an environment, the prevalence of firearms, rather than en-
hancing security, compromises it.68 
Consider the drive-by shooting, which gang researchers note is un-
usually common in gang-related shootings.69  Drive-bys accounted for 33% 
of gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County between 1989 and 1993, 
with 590 victims; nearly half of the persons shot at and a quarter of the ho-
micide victims were innocent bystanders.70  The frequency with which in-
nocent bystanders are shot illustrates the disadvantage of a drive-by 
shooting—it is not easy to hit the intended target from a moving vehicle.  
The tactic makes sense, however, in light of the rate at which gang mem-
bers carry firearms.  As we have seen, with gang membership comes fire-
arms, and if gang members believe that their targets are likely to be armed, 
                                                                                                                           
OFFENDER‘S PERSPECTIVE 69–71 (2009); David Hemenway et al., Gun Carrying Among Adolescents, 
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STUDS. 241, 257–58 (1998). 
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al. eds., 2007).  For a similar finding about Chicago, see Elizabeth Griffiths & Jorge M. Chavez, Com-
munities, Street Guns and Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980-1995: Merging Methods for Examin-
ing Homicide Trends Across Space and Time, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 941, 965–69 (2004). 
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the drive-by tactic often constitutes the safest way of approaching one‘s tar-
get and then making a getaway.71 
These are the consequences of a right to ―carry in case of confronta-
tion‖ in high-crime, inner-city neighborhoods.  They lay bare the contradic-
tion within the Second Amendment.  In the framing era, it may have been 
possible to speak of a ―right to keep and bear arms‖ that was ―necessary to 
the security of a free state,‖ but in high-crime inner-city neighborhoods, this 
formula does not hold.  At a minimum, keeping the ―militia‖ ―well regu-
lated‖ is likely to require a great deal more in the way of regulation than in 
the framing era.  Perhaps a demanding and highly discretionary system of 
carry permits, similar to that employed by New York City,72 could lend 
some substance to a right to ―bear‖ arms without threatening urban may-
hem, but it is doubtful that high-crime urban areas could go much further 
without reinstating the dynamics that led to the crime spike of the late 
1980s and early 1990s.73  Such are the problems when an eighteenth-century 
right is applied in the twenty-first century.  Even so, concern about the con-
sequences of a right to bear arms in urban America is more than a policy 
objection to a constitutional command which a Court can properly brush 
aside;74 it is a concern that the Second Amendment‘s preamble requires us 
to keep in mind. 
How then, are we to resolve the contradiction within the Second 
Amendment?  It seems that only the still-unresolved Second Amendment 
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II. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment Made 
Clearer, the Fourteenth Amendment Made Murky 
Joyce Lee Malcolm 
Ironically, the landmark Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. City 
of Chicago75 resolved one important question, the right of individuals to be 
armed, but managed to spawn an even more fundamental one, the proper 
standard for incorporation.  Two years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller 
the Court recognized the Second Amendment‘s protection of an individual 
right ―to keep and bear arms,‖76 and now, in McDonald, the Court has in-
corporated the Second Amendment as a right that must be recognized by 
the states.77  These decisions were a triumph for adherence to the popular 
understanding at the time of the amendment‘s inclusion in the Bill of Rights 
and its acceptance as a fundamental principle of American liberty.  Yet, 
apart from the anticipated impact on gun laws that will be considered be-
low, the conflicting approaches to incorporation so glaring in the McDonald 
opinions go to the core of our constitutional system.  Before replying to 
Professor Rosenthal‘s misgivings about the practical implications of the 
McDonald decision, this response considers the issues of how to incorpo-
rate the Second Amendment and the appropriate standard for incorporation. 
In considering the basis for incorporation, the Justices were seriously 
divided on what the proper means should be.  Justice Alito, writing for the 
majority, employs the long-accepted approach of incorporating the 
Amendment through the Due Process Clause.78  Justice Thomas agrees that 
the Second Amendment should be incorporated, but writes a lengthy and 
compelling opinion insisting, as petitioners urged, that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause is the appropriate means for incorporation.79  And Jus-
tice Stevens, in his dissent, sidesteps the clear case for incorporation by de-
vising an amorphous new standard for it—one the Second Amendment fails 
to meet—under a version of the Due Process Clause that he dubs the ―liber-
ty clause.‖80  This brief Essay is not the place to explore fully the implica-
tions of these conflicting approaches for Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, but I consider them briefly before turning to the appropriate-
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fessor Rosenthal about any potential harm to the ―stop and frisk‖ tactic he 
finds essential in combating gang violence. 
A.  
The debate over the proper means for incorporation begins with the 
McDonald petitioners‘ argument for incorporating the Second Amendment 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process 
Clause—although the issue likely would have arisen anyway.81  Alito and 
three concurring Justices are unwilling to make that shift.  ―For many dec-
ades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause 
of that Amendment,‖ Alito writes.82  ―We therefore decline to disturb the 
Slaughter-House holding.‖83  The Justices are not only concerned with dis-
turbing precedent, but also uncertain about the scope of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.84  In addition to recounting the historical evidence that 
an individual right to be armed is ―so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,‖85 the opinion provides a his-
tory of evolving standards for incorporation.  Justice Alito points out that, 
beginning in the 1960s, ―the Court abandoned ‗the notion that the Four-
teenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective 
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights‘‖86 and no longer 
asked ―whether any ‗civilized system [can] be imagined that would not ac-
cord the particular protection.‘‖87  The modern standard for incorporation is 
simply whether the guarantee in question ―is fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty and system of justice.‖88 
By contrast, Justice Thomas‘s opinion, while providing a moving ac-
count of the atrocities perpetrated against disarmed blacks and abolitionists, 
as well as the acceptance of the fundamental nature of the right to be armed, 
makes a compelling case for incorporation under the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  ―I cannot agree,‖ he writes, ―that [the Second Amendment 
right] is enforceable against the States through a clause that speaks only to 
‗process.‘‖89  ―The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees on-
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fine the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual 
user of words.‖90  Where the majority finds the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause too vague,91 Thomas finds the Due Process Clause equally proble-
matic: ―While this Court has at times concluded that a right gains ‗funda-
mental‘ status only if it is essential to the American ‗scheme of ordered 
liberty‘ or ‗―deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition‘ . . . the 
Court has just as often held that a right warrants Due Process Clause protec-
tion if it satisfies a far less measurable range of criteria . . . .‖92  Justice 
Thomas concludes that the Second Amendment is ―fully applicable to the 
States,‖ but he does so ―because the right to keep and bear arms is guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizen-
ship.‖93 
The Stevens dissent moves into a different realm.  Since historical evi-
dence would lead him to support incorporation, he damns its use, proclaim-
ing that ―a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the Constitution‘s 
command.‖94  This is especially strange for a Justice who relied upon the 
historical method in Heller to refute the notion that the Second Amendment 
guaranteed an individual right.95  But Justice Stevens goes even further, cut-
ting judges free from the text and intent of the Constitution by insisting that 
the historical approach ―is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans 
laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level of 
generality they chose when they crafted its language.‖96  Since he refuses to 
consider the history of ratification, one wonders where he got the odd no-
tion that Americans wanted the Fourteenth Amendment to embody ―an ex-
pansive principle,‖ rather than focusing on venerable constitutional rights.  
Stevens adds that the historical approach ―masks the value judgments that 
pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are suffi-
ciently ‗rooted‘ . . . [and] effaces this Court‘s distinctive role in saying what 
the law is, leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to majorita-
rian political processes.‖97  Justice Scalia objects vehemently to this view of 
objectivity and subjectivity: 
 
The subjective nature of Justice Stevens‘ standard is also 
apparent from his claim that it is the [C]ourt‘s preroga-
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so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers were too 
narrow-minded to imagine. Courts, he proclaims, must ‗do 
justice to [the Clause‘s] urgent call and its open texture‘ by 
exercising the ‗interpretive discretion the latter embodies‘ . 
. . And it would be ‗judicial abdication‘ for a judge to . . . 
‗outsourc[e]‘ the job to ‗historical sentiment.‘98 
 
Having rejected any examination of the historical approach, Justice 
Stevens resorts to a lengthy linguistic analysis of the words ―liberty‖ and 
―incorporation.‖99  Indeed, not until page twenty-seven of his dissent does 
he actually turn to a consideration of the Second Amendment.100  Stevens 
then reverts, for this one amendment, to those approaches to incorporation 
that Justice Alito explains were discarded by the Court fifty years earlier: 
that the right incorporated ―need not be identical in shape or scope to the 
rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights;‖101 that as ―local differences are to be che-
rished as elements of liberty,‖102 judges must be concerned about ―unduly 
restricting the States‘ ‗broad latitude in experimenting‘‖103; and, lastly, that 
judges need to consider whether the right under scrutiny is one that ―other 
civilized societies‖ recognize as central to liberty.104  In any event, Justice 
Stevens frankly refuses to accept the Court‘s holding in Heller, claiming it 
―sheds no light on the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖105  To Stevens, the Second Amendment ―still serves the struc-
tural function of protecting the States from encroachment by an overreach-
ing Federal Government.‖106  In his view, it is, in fact, a federal provision 
with no individual-right aspect related to self-defense.107 
Justice Breyer, concurring with the dissenters, argues for an additional 
requirement for incorporation: popular consensus.108  Justice Alito rejects 
this proposition out of hand, writing ―We have never held that a provision 
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sus‘ that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule.‖109  
Although, Justice Alito adds that in this instance there is evidence of such a 
consensus since 58 members of the Senate and 251 members of the House 
submitted an amicus brief in support of incorporation and 38 states submit-
ted another.110 
To summarize, the Court has given us three distinct means for incorpo-
ration: (1) the now customary Due Process Clause; (2) the more historically 
accurate Privileges or Immunities Clause; and (3) Justice Stevens‘ novel 
―Liberty Clause.‖  Justice Breyer‘s ―popular consensus‖ approach is argua-
bly a fourth method.  Justice Scalia particularly takes issue with Stevens‘ 
approach because it reverts, at least for the Second Amendment, to separat-
ing rights into different classes.  It would leave judges, rather than the Con-
stitution and the political process, as the propounders of what is or is not a 
fundamental right.  Although the issue may seem of minor importance since 
nearly all the Bill of Rights amendments have been incorporated already, 
there is a universe of other ―liberties‖ the Court might in the future decide 
are fundamental rights.  Justice Scalia finds great danger in Stevens‘ vision 
of the role of the Court: 
 
Justice Stevens abhors a system in which ‗majorities or 
powerful interest groups always get their way,‘ but replaces 
it with a system in which unelected and life-tenured judges 
always get their way.  That such usurpation is effected un-
abashedly . . . makes it even worse.  In a vibrant democra-
cy, usurpation should have to be accomplished in the dark.  
It is Justice Stevens‘ approach, not the Court‘s, that puts 
democracy in peril.111 
 
Scalia‘s warning about the hazard to our constitutional system posed 
by Justice Stevens‘ approach is well taken.  Stevens‘ approach would free 
judges from the restraint of legal precedent and constitutional text.  It would 
give unelected judges license to indulge their personal views with little re-
gard for the Constitution or the legal system they swear to uphold.  It is lit-
tle comfort that none of the other Justices joined Stevens in this last opinion 
of his tenure on the Court. 
B.  
Now, this Essay turns to the McDonald decision and the serious ques-
tion of the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second Amendment rights.  
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status, the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the 
press and freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment 
rights.112  All rights have some restrictions, and the Second Amendment is 
no different.  Indeed, the Heller opinion explicitly acknowledged that and 
suggested that nothing in the opinion ―should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.‖113  As Professor Rosenthal 
correctly notes, beyond this disclaimer, the Heller Court did not squarely 
deal with the term ―infringed‖ in the Amendment‘s text.114  In Heller, it was 
not a significant issue.  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia assured in his opinion in 
Heller that the Court is not ignorant of the handgun violence in this coun-
try.115  But, as Justice Scalia put it, ―the enshrinement of constitutional 
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.  These include 
the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the 
home.‖116 The Court also emphasized that the District of Columbia has 
many constitutional options to combat the problem.117 
In that light, the regulations put in place by Washington, D.C. after the 
Heller Court overturned its gun ban are clearly designed to achieve the 
same result as the former ban by making the procedures for registering a 
handgun in the city as onerous as possible.118  An applicant must go through 
two background checks, make four visits to the police department, provide 
fingerprints, a photo, and a job history, pass a twenty-question test on D.C. 
firearms laws, pass a five-hour class with a trainer selected from a list the 
city provides, including one hour on a gun range (the city doesn‘t have one 
nor will it permit a gun shop or gun sales in city limits), and pay $300 in 
fees, after all of which the gun must be taken back to the police and fired 
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identification technology that has not yet been adopted by the industry.120  
The registration expires after three years, and if it lapses the police may se-
ize the gun and the owner is subject to up to one year in jail and fined 
$1000.121 
Likewise, Chicago passed a new ordinance four days after the Supreme 
Court overturned its gun ban.  The new rule permits residents to own a 
handgun in the home but imposes serious restrictions and a series of bu-
reaucratic hurdles intended to discourage ownership.122  Gun shops are 
banned in the city, as are all firearms sales.123  The registrant must pass a 
four-hour class, spend an hour on a gun range (the city bans gun ranges), 
and transport the gun ―broken down,‖ unloaded, and in a case.124  The owner 
must keep the gun inside a building; it is illegal to take it into a garage or to 
bring it onto a porch or to a yard.125  Each gun must be registered within five 
days of purchase.126  The first test of the McDonald decision will be these 
new municipal regulations that are seemingly designed to circumvent citi-
zens‘ lawful right to keep a handgun in their homes for self-defense.  Five 
days before the new Chicago gun regulation went into effect, a federal law-
suit had already been filed against the city.127 
C.  
As to further tests of the McDonald decision, Professor Rosenthal has 
particular anxieties.  Are they justified?  Is Professor Rosenthal correct that 
not only allowing law-abiding residents of Chicago to have firearms in their 
homes, but granting them the right to carry weapons, would severely ham-
per the effectiveness of the city‘s ―stop and frisk‖ strategies—with dire re-
sults?128  Indeed, Professor Rosenthal raises the specter that this would 
produce an escalating homicide rate and also ―could enable urban street 
gangs to act as occupying armies.‖129  He even envisions a world where 
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use ―their ability to go about armed‖ in order to ―establish criminal mini-
states based on drug trafficking . . . .‖130 
Calm reflection is called for to put the situation in context.  The city of 
Chicago has banned residents from keeping handguns, rifles and shotguns 
for their defense since 1982, some eighteen years.131  But as Justice Alito 
reminds us, that has not made Otis McDonald or others living in what are 
still high-crime areas safer.132  Chicago‘s prohibition has not swept guns 
from the city.  It has only succeeded in disarming those who obey the law, 
leaving them vulnerable to thugs who have no intention of registering their 
guns.  Although the police are free to ―stop and frisk‖ those they suspect of 
criminal intent, the number of Chicago homicide victims this year equaled 
the number of American soldiers killed during the same period in Afghanis-
tan and Iraq together.133  In fact, two Illinois legislators representing Chica-
go districts called on the governor of the state to deploy the National Guard 
to patrol the city streets.134 
The 1976 District of Columbia gun ban overturned by the Heller deci-
sion was no more successful.  A study comparing the District with forty-
nine other major cities found the District‘s homicide rate substantially high-
er relative to those cities than it had been before its gun ban was passed.135  
However, as Justice Breyer notes, other scholarship has shown that owner-
ship of a handgun increases public safety.136 
While forty states presently permit law-abiding residents who fulfill 
certain requirements to carry a concealed weapon, Professor Rosenthal can 
take heart from the fact that firearms crime on the whole has not risen.  This 
permissive approach to gun possession has not unleashed a rash of shoo-
touts; the nation‘s homicide rate has been declining for more than thirty 
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for that year shows crime rates dropped across America.139  Firearms in the 
hands of lawful citizens can and do deter would-be assailants.140  Success, of 
course, has many fathers, but Professor Rosenthal would have you believe 
the power of police to stop and frisk people on the street was the sole cause 
for this decline.  An article in the Christian Science Monitor suggests six 
reasons why serious crime has been in decline—of which ―proactive‖ polic-
ing is only one—and includes a variety of approaches to reducing crime in 
addition to frisking.141 
One rather strained concern Professor Rosenthal raises involves the use 
of the word ―well regulated‖ in the Second Amendment‘s militia clause.142  
He notes that ―the [Heller] Court breezed past‖ the adjective ―well-
regulated,‖ dismissing it as ―impl[ying] nothing more than the imposition of 
proper discipline and training.‖143  Quite right.  They did breeze by it and it 
does merely mean ―well-trained.‖  A militia that is not well-trained is more 
dangerous than useful.  However, while the militia was, with certain excep-
tions, drawn from the entire population of citizens, the well-trained and 
drilled militia included only those physically fit men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five.144  But since the text merely describes the militia as 
―well-regulated,‖ Professor Rosenthal argues that the Second Amendment, 
―construed in light of the preamble,‖ gives government the authority to sub-
ject the larger group—the unorganized militia—to ―proper training and dis-
cipline,‖ thereby giving the government ―comprehensive regulation of all 
who possess and carry firearms.‖145  He goes on to posit that such an ap-
proach explains the Court‘s acceptance of regulations—such as concealed 
weapons prohibitions—that would otherwise seem to infringe on the right 
to possess firearms.146 
Professor Rosenthal gets an ―A‖ for invention, but this interpretation is 
not credible.  It waives aside the acknowledged fact that no right is absolute 
and that therefore laws that in some way restricted the right to be armed by 
prohibiting unsafe use before the adoption of the Second Amendment were 
not regarded as infringing on the core right.  His reference to an argument 
limiting regulations to those of the 18th century is, he admits, ―inconsistent 
with Heller‘s dicta,‖ or, one might add, common sense.147  But he neverthe-
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thority to the Second Amendment‘s ―well-regulated militia‖ reference.  
That analysis is a bucket that will not hold water. 
D.  
To conclude, the McDonald decision has incorporated the Second 
Amendment right as a core right, not a second-class, watered down version 
that can be effectively thwarted by state or city action.  Are reasonable 
regulations ―interest-balancing‖?  If so, then reasonable regulations of all 
core rights are interest-balancing.  Are there dangers in granting lawful citi-
zens a right to keep and bear arms?  Yes, but there are dangers in every 
right.  As the English jurist Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained in a 1985 
opinion, ―[i]t is implicit in a genuine right that its exercise may work 
against (some facet of) the public interest: a right to speak only where its 
exercise advanced the public welfare or public policy . . . would be a hollow 
guarantee against repression.‖148  The experience of a majority of states, 
however, has shown that honoring the right of the people to keep and bear 
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III. Second Amendment Plumbing After McDonald: A Reply to 
Professor Malcolm 
Lawrence Rosenthal 
Joyce Malcolm worries about some things and not others.  She is con-
cerned about what she regards as the historical inaccuracy of all of the opi-
nions but Justice Thomas‘s in McDonald v. City of Chicago,149 but she is 
supremely confident that her vigorous conception of Second Amendment 
rights will not lead to chaos in the inner city.  I am afraid that she rather has 
things backwards. 
A.  
Let us start with Professor Malcolm‘s assessment of McDonald.  She 
commends Justice Thomas‘s opinion, which, she tells us, ―makes a compel-
ling case for incorporation [of the Second Amendment] under the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.‖150  She tells us that this approach, of those taken by 
the various opinions in McDonald, is ―the more historically accurate.‖151  In 
the opinion that Professor Malcolm finds so compelling, Justice Thomas 
tells us that ―constitutional provisions are ‗written to be understood by the 
voters.‘  Thus, the objective of this inquiry is to discern what ‗ordinary citi-
zens‘ at the time of ratification would have understood the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to mean.‖152  After reviewing the historical evidence, 
Justice Thomas concludes that ―the ratifying public understood the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated rights, 
including the right to keep and bear arms.‖153  Justice Thomas did indeed 
make a compelling case, if only because he so assiduously overlooked vir-
tually all of the historical evidence inconsistent with his conclusion. 
I have elsewhere canvassed the confusing and conflicting evidence on 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.154  I will not repeat that discussion here, but it is worth noting 
some of Justice Thomas‘s most remarkable omissions.  If, for example, the 
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enumerated rights binding on the states, one might expect some effort in the 
ratifying states to make their own laws consistent with these enumerated 
rights.  Yet, ratification produced no effort to bring state laws into confor-
mity with the Bill of Rights.155  In particular, ratification did nothing to halt 
a trend in the states toward prosecution by information, despite its inconsis-
tency with the Fifth Amendment‘s Grand Jury Clause.156  This is not what 
one would expect had there been a general understanding that the Four-
teenth Amendment had rendered all enumerated constitutional rights appli-
cable to the states.  About this historical evidence, Justice Thomas offers 
no comment. 
Justice Thomas also notes that three framing-era treatises indicated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated constitutionally enume-
rated rights against the states.157  Yet, Justice Thomas ignores significant 
ambiguities and errors in those treatises and fails to mention that other 
leading treatises of the era found no incorporationist meaning in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.158  Again, if there had been a general under-
standing that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Second Amendment 
and other constitutional rights previously protected against only the fed-
eral government applicable to the states, surely it is remarkable that 
leading legal scholars of the day such as Joel Prentiss Bishop, Thomas 
Cooley, John Forrest Dillon, and Francis Wharton somehow did not get 
the message.159 
As for judicial discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
wake of ratification, Justice Thomas tells us that one lower court, in a 
decision ―written by a future Justice of this Court,‖ wrote an opinion 
embracing incorporation,160 while leaving unmentioned two other fram-
ing-era decisions to the contrary.161  Even more striking, Justice Thomas 
was evidently unconcerned that those actually sitting on the Court, in a 
series of framing-era cases, rejected an incorporationist reading of the 
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the Court found infirm counts of an indictment alleging violations of the 
right to keep and bear arms, brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870, 
which prohibited conspiracies to ―hinder . . . free exercise and enjoyment of 
any right or privilege . . . secured . . . by the constitution or laws of the Unit-
ed States,‖164 writing: ―The second amendment declares that it shall not be 
infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be in-
fringed by Congress.‖165  The Cruikshank Court added that nondiscrimi-
nation was the animating principle of the Fourteenth Amendment: ―The 
equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. . . .  The only 
obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny 
the right.  This the amendment guarantees, but no more.‖166 
For his part, Justice Thomas acknowledged that his view was inconsis-
tent with Cruikshank and other framing-era precedents of the Supreme 
Court.167  Yet he failed to consider whether the framing-era Court‘s take on 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment undermined his own assessment 
of the historical evidence of original meaning.168  It is curious, to say the 
least, that Justice Thomas gave more weight to the view of ―a future Jus-
tice‖ than the views of those actually serving on the Court.169  Justice Tho-
mas‘s disdain for the views of the framing-era Supreme Court is even more 
inexplicable when one considers that he had several years earlier joined an 
opinion affording special deference to the Court‘s framing-era decisions in-
terpreting the Fourteenth Amendment due to ―the insight attributable to the 
Members of the Court at that time,‖ since they ―obviously had intimate 
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My point is not that the preponderance of the historical evidence tilts 
against incorporation.  My own view is that the historical evidence is suffi-
ciently near equipoise, and sufficiently fragmentary and unreliable, that it 
provides no satisfactory basis for resolution of the incorporation debate.171  
For present purposes, however, the important point is that Justice Thomas‘s 
opinion in McDonald—and Professor Malcolm‘s eager embrace of it—is 
rather an argument against originalist constitutional adjudication.  Much has 
been written of the dangers of ―law office history,‖ in which historical evi-
dence of original meaning is assessed with an advocate‘s jaundiced eye that 
cherry-picks only the evidence supporting a predetermined conclusion.172  
Justice Thomas‘s opinion is a pretty good example of the problem.  Any 
case looks easy if one looks to only the evidence in favor of one‘s preferred 
conclusion. 
B.  
Professor Malcolm, while advocating ―strict scrutiny‖ for firearms 
regulations,173 seems unconcerned with what this may mean for firearms 
violence in the inner city because ―the nation‘s homicide rate has been 
declining for more than thirty years,‖174 and a reporter for the Christian 
Science Monitor assures her that there are six reasons for the crime de-
cline ―of which ‗proactive‘ policing is only one—and includes a variety 
of approaches to reducing crime in addition to frisking.‖175  For those 
who take their criminology from sources other than the Christian 
Science Monitor, however, there is cause for concern. 
Professor Malcolm‘s account of homicide rates in recent decades is 
flat-out wrong; as I have explained elsewhere, there was an enormous 
and unprecedented spike in homicide and other forms of violent crime in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, concentrated in firearms-related crime in 
disadvantaged inner-city communities, as a consequence of the violent 
competition following the introduction of crack cocaine.176  The crime-
rise period was followed by a crime decline reaching levels not seen in 
nearly four decades,177 and had no evident demographic or economic ex-
planation.178  Professor Malcolm seems to favor John Lott‘s theory that 
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stimulated crime declines,179 but as I noted in my opening essay, there 
are serious methodological challenges to Lott‘s work.180  In any event, 
Lott himself makes no claim that any significant portion of the crime drop 
since the early 1990s can be attributed to concealed-carry laws.181  And, as I 
also noted in my opening essay, the ability to carry firearms offers no guar-
antee of effective self-defense, at least in unstable urban neighborhoods.  
Members of criminal street gangs carry firearms at vastly elevated levels 
compared to the general population, yet they also have vastly elevated ho-
micide victimization rates.182  More guns do not always mean less crime. 
Consider New York City, which had violent crime rates typical of 
other large cities in 1990, but in the succeeding decade achieved crime 
declines of about double those in the rest of the country, and which out-
performed each of the nation‘s fifteen largest cities.183  There is much 
evidence that the decline resulted from escalation in stop-and-frisk tac-
tics associated with enforcement of New York‘s tough gun-control 
laws.184  Those laws are indeed stringent; New York rarely issues permits 
authorizing the possession or carrying of handguns, and for that reason, 
its laws have been characterized as imposing an effective handgun 
ban.185  Thus, a regulatory regime nearly as rigorous as that invalidated 
in Heller—and quite different than that advocated by Lott—when 
coupled with aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, has the best record in the 
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C.  
As for her advocacy of strict scrutiny,187 although she never bothers 
to explain how her proposal for strict scrutiny of firearms regulations 
can be squared with Heller‘s list of ―presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures,‖188 Professor Malcolm claims that my reliance on the Second 
Amendment‘s preamble as a source of regulatory authority ―is a bucket 
that will not hold water.‖189  She does not, however, actually get around 
to giving a reason to support this conclusion. 
As I explained in my opening essay, if one were to consult no more 
than the original meaning of the Second Amendment‘s operative clause, 
there would seem to be no power to limit the right to possess and carry 
firearms in common civilian use.190  Nor is framing-era practice much 
help; although Professor Malcolm claims that ―laws that in some way re-
stricted the right to be armed by prohibiting unsafe use before the adop-
tion of the Second Amendment were not regarded as infringing on the 
core right,‖191 in Heller, the Court concluded that there was little framing-
era support for firearms regulation aside from laws addressing gunpowder 
storage and the discharge of firearms.192  Such regulations seem entirely 
compatible with the operative clause‘s protection of a right to possess and 
carry firearms in common use—unlike many of the other prohibitions 
deemed presumptively lawful in Heller.  Professor Malcolm, in short, has 
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no textual explanation for the Heller dicta on permissible firearms regula-
tion—dicta she nevertheless endorses.193 
Nor does the rubric of ―strict scrutiny‖ explain Heller‘s discussion of 
―presumptively lawful‖ gun-control measures.  Even if some allowance for 
regulations that pass searching judicial scrutiny could be squared with the 
Second Amendment‘s text as Professor Malcolm reads it, strict scrutiny 
does not ordinarily tolerate purely prophylactic regulation such as prohibi-
tions on carrying concealed weapons justified as an effort to prevent violent 
confrontations.  In one of the First Amendment strict scrutiny cases that 
Professor Malcolm cites, for example, the Court rejected an argument that a 
statutory prohibition on corporate-funded electioneering could be justified 
as a means to prevent corruption because the prohibition swept beyond the 
type of corrupt quid-pro-quo that the government has a compelling interest 
in preventing.194  If we are to take strict scrutiny seriously, it is hard to un-
derstand how a ban on carrying concealed firearms could fare any better. 
If, however, the Second Amendment‘s operative clause is construed in 
light of the preamble‘s contemplation of a ―well regulated militia,‖ that is, 
―the imposition of proper discipline and training‖ on not only those enrolled 
in a formal military organization but instead all who are ―physically capable 
of acting in concert for the common defense,‖195 then the Second Amend-
ment envisions unusually comprehensive regulatory authority of the type 
blessed in the Heller dicta. 
The Second Amendment is, after all, a legal text.  Surely an approach 
to the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny that is compatible with the 
text is preferable to one that is not.  My own reliance on the Second 
Amendment‘s preamble to establish a standard of scrutiny has a textual 
foundation; Professor Malcolm‘s approach, as far as I can tell, has none.  
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